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COIMENT
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORTH CAROLINA'S
MOMENT OF SILENCE STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the constitutionality of
the new North Carolina Moment of Silence statute.1 This comment
will begin with a historical review of the adoption of the First Amend-
ment, followed by a review of Supreme Court case law associated with
the question of prayer in school. Finally, the comment will compare
the North Carolina statute with other states' moment of silence laws
and ultimately conclude that the statute would be declared unconstitu-
tional under the current framework of the "Lemon Test."2
II. HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Historical Events
The history of the adoption of the First Amendment has been of
little assistance in interpreting the intentions behind its adoption. At
the time of the proposed adoption, there were many problems facing
the Articles of Confederation including their failure to ensure that the
federal government worked properly.3 Therefore, the Virginia As-
sembly called a meeting of representatives in Annapolis, Maryland in
September, 1786. The stated purpose of the meeting was to create a
uniform system of commercial regulations.4 Subsequent to the meet-
ing in Annapolis, Congress called for a convention in Philadelphia in
May of 1787. The sole purpose for the convention was to amend the
Articles of Confederation, to "rend[er] the federal constitution ade-
quate to the exigencies of government and [to] preserve the Union."'5
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-47(29) (Supp. 1995); See infra note 128.
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding as unconstitutional, a statute that
provided reimbursement of teachers' salaries, textbooks and instructional material, and payment
of a supplement to teachers in church related schools).
3. JAMES H. LEAHY, THm FrST AENDmEN-r 1791-1991: Two HUNDRED YEAnS OF
FREEDOM 1 (1991). Examples of the government's inability to function included: inexistence of
a uniform system of currency; business transactions between states were almost impossible; Con-
gress could not negotiate treaties; and, Congress had no authority to levy taxes. Id.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id. The Constitutional Convention was assembled in May 1787 with all states repre-
sented except Rhode Island. Id. at 11.
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The original Constitution was designed to form a strong central gov-
ernment, yet provide the states with a substantial degree of indepen-
dence. At the time of its ratification in 1777, there was little, if any,
discussion about civil or individual rights. Representatives of the
Constitutional Convention, however, suggested a variety of amend-
ments that focused specifically on individual rights, including freedom
of religion.6
The push for civil or individual rights was a result of a number of
historic events. The colonists from England were familiar with the
Magna Carta of 1215 and the Petition of Rights of 1628. Both docu-
ments provided some rights to citizens and some limitations on the
power of government.7 In addition, many of the colonists had fled
their homelands as a result of religious and social persecution.8
Therefore, it was not suprising that many of the citizens and their rep-
resentatives were concerned about the government's ability to regu-
late a person's individual choices. 9
Thomas Jefferson was responsible for the adoption of the Statute
for Religious Freedom by the Virginia Assembly.10 The statute,
adopted in 1786, stated that "[n]o man shall be compelled to frequent
or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever.., nor
shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief
.... ""l By 1787, many states had ratified their own "Bill of Rights"
including Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. 2
The momentum peaked on May 4, 1789, when James Madison in-
troduced twenty-five amendments to the Constitution. These amend-
ments represented a compilation of over 200 amendments
recommended by the States.' 3 Most of the proposed amendments ad-
vocated protecting the people from the government.' 4 There was lit-
tle discussion about the content of the proposed amendments; rather,
6. Id. at 13; See also JOSEPH STORY, Commm4rAaniS ON THm CONSTITUTION OF Tim.
UNITED STATES, VOLUME III, 713 (1970).
7. LEAHY, supra note 3, at 13. The Magna Carta stated "every person... was protected in
the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property." Id.
8. Robert L. Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of the
First Amendment, 9 HAzv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 129, 134 (1986).
9. The concern for individual rights was apparent in a letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison dated December 20,1787. Jefferson expressed concern that no Bill of Rights had
been adopted and stated "[t]he Bill of Rights is what the people are entitled to against every
government on earth... and what no just government should refuse." LEAHY, supra note 3, at
4.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 13.
13. See generally FRAacIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF Tim
UTrrED STATES, VOLUME II: 1788-1861, 199-214 (1901).
14. Id. at 216.
1996]
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the discussion focused on the procedure for adopting the amend-
ments.' 5 On July 23, 1789, the amendments were referred to a Select
Committee of One from each state.'6 The original First Amendment
was numbered the fourth and read "[n]o religion shall be established
by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed.' 7
The Select Committee of One from each state reported back to the
House on August 13, 1789. The content of the amendments had basi-
cally remained unchanged, but the number had been cut from twenty
to eighteen.18 On August 13, 1789, the House began its discussion,
focusing primarly on where the amendments should be added to the
Constitution. Ultimately, the House agreed to incorporate them into
the body of the Constitution.' 9
On August 14, 1789, the House began debating the content of the
proposed amendments. The proposed Fourth Amendment, which
eventually became the First Amendment, was disliked by many repre-
sentatives.20 When the House questioned Madison on what he
thought the First Amendment meant, he stated "[t]hat Congress shall
not establish a religion and enforce the legal observance of it by law,
or compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience."21
Three schools of thought as to the need for the First Amendment
emerged during the debate. The first school of thought was advanced
by Roger Williams.22 Under his evangelical view, separation of
church and state was a way to protect the church from the state.23 A
second school of thought was led by Thomas Jefferson, who felt sepa-
ration of church and state was a way to protect the state from the
church.24 Finally, James Madison led the third school of thought
which saw separation as a way to preserve public order and protect
each religious sect from other religious sects. 5
After some discussion, the proposed amendment was changed to
read "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the
rights of conscience." 26 This change appears to reflect the evangelical
view supported by Roger Williams and the Madison view of separa-
15. 1& at 217-18.
16. l at 224.
17. l& at 227-29.
18. Id. at 224.
19. Id. at 227-29.
20. l& at 237.
21. Id
22. Church leader from Massachusets. Id. at 237.
23. LAURENCE C. TRmE, AMEucAN CONSrn-UONAL LAw 816-17 (1978).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 817.
26. TH RPE, supra note 13, at 239.
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tion. The proposed amendment strictly forbade Congress from mak-
ing any law that affected religion. That portion of the proposed
amendment supported Roger Williams' concern for the protection of
the church from the state. Forbidding Congress to infringe the rights
of conscience appeared to support Madison's concern for complete
separation, as evidenced by an earlier letter he wrote to George Eve
on January 2, 1789.27 In addition, the original proposed amendment,
authored by Madison, had included a similar prohibition against the
infringement of the rights of conscience.2
The proposed amendments were given to a Special Committee that
rearranged their order, rewrote them to reflect the proposed changes,
and submitted a report to the Senate.29 The Special Committee's re-
port, consisting of seventeen proposed amendments, was heard by the
Senate on August 25, 1789.30
The amendments had undergone substantial change from their orig-
inal form. There were now only twelve, and the proposed Fourth
Amendment read "[c]ongress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof. '31 The
First Amendment was eventually ratified on December 15, 1791.32
B. Interpretation of the Historical Events
There are as many commentaries on the adoption of the First
Amendment as there are theories about its original meaning and the
intentions of those who adopted it.33 Two major theories, however,
remain most popular. Under one theory, the original intention was to
protect the established religions in various states from the federal gov-
ernment. 4 This theory has support in history, in that in the same year
the First Amendment was proposed, a bill to appoint chaplains for
both the House and the Senate was approved. In addition, many
27. Id. at 227-28. The letter stated "[t]he amendments thought necessary by Madison were
to secure the rights of conscience." Id.
28. FRANcis NEWTON THORPE, Tim CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF Tim UN= STATES,
VOLUME II: 1788-1861, 199-214 (1901).
29. Id. at 257.
30. Id. at 257-59. The Senate disliked a number of the amendments and sent them back to
the House with modifications. Subsequently, the House refused to make the modifications and
the amendments were sent to a Committee of Conference. On September 24, 1789, the House
agreed to most of the revisions suggested by the Senate. Id. at 259.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. THORPE, supra note 13, at 261.
33. See Robert L. Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of
the First Amendment, 9 HARv. J.L. & Puin. PoL'y 129 (1986); LAURENCE C. TRmE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978); MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND PoLncs: Tim INTENTIONS
OF Tim AuoaORS OF Tim FmsT AmENDMENT (1978).
34. Cord, supra note 8, at 140.
35. Id. at 140.
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states had established churches and it was not until 1833 that the last
state-established church was dissolved.36 Commentators have argued
that this supports a "no preference" approach to First Amendment
analysis. 7 Under the "no preference" approach, the government
would not prefer one religion over another and would not establish a
national religion. However, it would allow for financial support of re-
ligions as long as no religion was rejected because of a preference for
another religion. 8 This theory has not been accepted by the Supreme
Court.
The second theory is that the original intention in adopting the First
Amendment was to "build a wall between church and state." 39 This
"wall" completely separates the two entities and would make financial
support of religion unconstitutional.4° This theory was endorsed by
the Supreme Court and is reflected in the currently used "Lemon
Test."' 41 This theory also has support from a historical context. As
early as 1785, James Madison, a strong contributor to the First
Amendment, authored a book entitled Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments. The book advocated total separation
of church and state.42 Also, Jefferson and Madison defeated a pro-
posed bill in Virginia that would have allowed a tax levy for the sup-
port of the established church.43 The theory of separation was also
expressed by Roger Williams when he stated that there is a "wall of
separation between the garden of the Church and the wilderness of
the world."' 4
C. Current Supreme Court Interpretation
These two themes, and the history surrounding them, were dis-
cussed in depth by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Educa-
36. Id. at 158; See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 n.5
(1962).
37. Cord, supra note 8, at 137; See also Richard S. Myers, The Establishment Clause and
Nativity Scenes: A Reassessment of Lynch v. Donnelly, 77 Ky. L. J. 61 (1989); ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACr OR FICrION (1982); MICHAEL J. MAL-
BIN, RELIGION AND PoLncs: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AuTIoRS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
9 (1978); RODNEY K. SMIH, Punuc PRAYER AND Tim CONSTITUTION (1987).
38. Cord, supra note 8, at 169.
39. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding the federal government's right
to make bigamy a crime in federal territories over the objection of a Morman who claimed that
polygamy was his religious duty). See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 216 (1962).
40. Cord, supra note 8, at 169; Everson v. Board of Educ. of the Township of Erving, 330
U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947).
41. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
42. LEAHY, supra note 3, at 4.
43. Cord, supra note 8, at 133-34.
44. S. Rabinove, Separation For Religion's Sake, FmsT TimiNGs 7, 116 (May 1990).
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lion of the Township of Erving.45 In Everson, the Supreme Court
determined that the two themes reflected two fundamental goals of
the initial proponents of the First Amendment.' The first goal was
voluntarism, described by Lawrence Tribe as the guarantee of "free-
dom of conscience by preventing any degree of compulsion in the
matters of belief."47 The goal of voluntarism is expressed in the por-
tion of the First Amendment that reads "Congress shall make no law
... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]. 48 This clause became
known as the Free Exercise Clause.49
The second goal was separatism, often referred to as the neutrality
principle.50 Under this principle, church and state should function in-
dependently of one another.51 The goal of separatism does not appear
to be directly expressed in the First Amendment.52 Rather, it is an
interpretation based on the history and the apparent intentions of the
individuals who adopted the First Amendment. The portion of the
First Amendment which states that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting the establishment of a religion.. .,,3 is called the Establish-
ment Clause. This clause reflects a means of assuring that government
does not excessively intrude upon religious liberty.54
The Supreme Court has maintained the two goals first mentioned in
Everson, and has refined the current Lemon Test to reflect that the
intention of the First Amendment was to build a "wall." 55 Therefore,
this comment will reflect on the Supreme Court's modem view of the
First Amendment, its interpretation using the Lemon Test, and the
application of the test to North Carolina's "moment of silence"
Statute.
45. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
46. Id. at 8-16.
47. TamE, supra note 23, at 818.
48. U.S. Cor0s. amend. I; TRiE, supra note 23, at 818.
49. TRIBE, supra note 23, at 818.
50. Id. at 819.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
54. TRIE, supra note 23, at 815.
55. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that prayers offered at a graduation
ceremony were forbidden by the Establishment Clause); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a Christmas display that included a creche violated the Establish-
ment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (declaring unconstitutional a statute author-
izing a one-minute moment of silence in public schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
(declaring unconstitutional a Kentucky statute that required the posting of a copy of the Ten
Commandments, purchased with private donations, on the wall of each public school classroom);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (prohibiting the reimbursement of nonpublic schoolchil-
dren for the purchase of school supplies); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding
that a public school can not prevent the teaching of evolution); Everson v. Board of Educ. of the
Township of Erving 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (striking funding to reimburse parents of private school
children for bus fares).
1996]
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III. THE "LEMON TEST"
A. Analytical Framework
The Lemon Test is comprised of three parts which, in the words of
Chief Justice Burger, were a "cumulative criteria developed by the
Court over many years." 6 The issue before the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman 7 was whether it was constitutional for the State of Rhode
Island to supplement non-public school teachers' salaries.5 The
Court concluded that it was unconstitutional. In reaching its decision,
the Court applied a three-pronged test to determine whether the gov-
ernmental action violated the Establishment Clause. The Court ex-
plained that to be valid, the action must satisfy the following
conditions: (i) it must have a secular legislative purpose; (ii) the pri-
mary effect of the action must neither advance nor inhibit religion;
and (iii) the action must not foster an excessive governmental
entanglement.5 9
1. First Prong - Secular Purpose
The requirement of a secular purpose was first pronounced in
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.60 In Schempp, the
Court was asked to decide whether state action requiring schools to
begin each day with readings from the Bible was constitutional. The
Court debated at length whether there was a secular purpose and con-
cluded there was none. 1 The Court had previously decided that the
daily reciting of prayers in classrooms was unconstitutional and that
the only purpose of such prayers was religious.6 Although the
Schempp Court did not clearly determine whether a secular legislative
purpose existed, it relied on the remise that the character of reciting
prayers is inherently religious.6 In Board of Education of Central
School District No. 1 v. Allen,' the Court stated "that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legisla-
tive purpose .... ,,6s Subsequent decisions have regularly applied the
requirement of a secular legislative purpose to challenged actions in-
56. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
57. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
58. Id.
59. Ik at 612.
60. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
61. IdM at 224.
62. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962) (holding that reading of a state composed non-
denominational prayer in the classroom violated the Establishment Clause).
63. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222-23.
64. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
65. 392 U.S. 236,243 (1968) (upholding a New York statute that allowed school books to be
loaned to parochial and non-parochial school children) (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
7
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volving the Establishment Clause.66 The Court has also stated that a
violation of the first prong will cause a statute to fail as unconstitu-
tional without considering either of the subsequent prongs.67
2. Second Prong - Primary Effect
The second prong of the Lemon Test requires that the challenged
action has neither the principal nor the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion.68 The concept of questioning the primary effect of
the challenged action was first noted in Schempp.69 In a subsequent
case, the Court stated "that to withstand the strictures of the Estab-
lishment Clause there must be a... primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion. '70
The Supreme Court has articulated three possible analyses to deter-mine whether the second prong has been satisified. Under the first
analysis, the Court considers whether the institution that will receive
the benefit is pervasively sectarian.71 The Court has stated that
"[e]ven though earmarked for secular purposes, 'when it flows to an
institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission,' state aid has
the impermissible primary effect of advancing religion."72
The second possible analysis articulated by the Supreme Court was
first introduced in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball.73 In Grand
Rapids, the Supreme Court stated that elementary and secondary
school children are especially susceptible to indoctrination because of
their age and inexperience. 74 The Court has considered the age of the
children and the classroom setting pivotal in several other cases where
it determined that a challenged action was unconstitutional.7'
66. See e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1984).
67. Stone, 449 U.S. at 40-41.
68. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
69. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Court noted that readings, without comment, from the Bible
have the effect of advancing religion because "the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be
gainsaid." Id. at 224 (1963).
70. Board of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (citations
omitted).
71. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 411 (1985) (declaring it was unconstitutional to pay
salaries of parochial school personnel with federal funds).
72. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975) (challenging Pennsylvania statutes pro-
viding for auxiliary services and loans of textbooks and materials to nonpublic elementary and
secondary schools) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
73. 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (determing that a shared time program using public school class-
rooms and teachers for nonpublic school children was unconstitutional).
74. Id. at 391.
75. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding a Louisiana statute that prohib-
ited teaching the Theory of Evolution was unconstitutional); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980); School Dist. of Abington Township. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
1996]
8
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 [1996], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol22/iss2/5
208 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:200
The third analysis for the second prong was also established in
Grand Rapids. Justice O'Connor stated that a statute is unconstitu-
tional if it creates the appearance of a "crucial symbolic link."'7 6 Such
a link has been found in other cases, especially those involving a class-
room setting or young children. 77
3. Third Prong - Excessive Entanglement
To satisfy the third prong of the Lemon Test, the challenged action
must not foster an "excessive entanglement" between the government
and religion.78 This prong appears to express the Court's recognition
of other factors that can affect the constitutionality of a particular
challenged action. Those factors include whether the aid takes place
in a school setting,79 the age of the children,s0 and whether the aid is
for all people and incidentally benefits a religious organization, or
whether it specifically helps a particular religion. 1 In Lemon, the
Supreme Court outlined three factors to consider when evaluating the
question of excessive entanglement.8 The first factor is the character
and purpose of the proposed recipient of the challenged entitlement.83
The second factor is the nature of the aid provided. In general, direct
entitlements to religious organizations or for a religious purpose are
considered unconstitutional,' whereas, indirect or incidental benefits
to religious organizations have been considered constitutional.85 The
third factor to consider is the resulting relationship between the gov-
76. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 385.
77. Board of Educ. of westside Community Scbs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (finding
no symbolic link between an after-school religious club and the government); Bowen v. Ken-
drick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (finding no symbolic link between religion and government even
though the Adolescent Family Life Act grants may be given to religious institutions).
78. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. The Supreme Court announced this prong in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (upholding property tax exemptions for places of religious
worship).
79. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 236.
80. See Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985);
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (distinguishing between a secondary school
environment and a university environment and finding that a Maryland statute providing state
funds to religious universities was constitutional).
81. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
82. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); New York v. Cathedral Academy,
434 U.S. 125 (1977) (holding a direct entitlement to parochial schools for state mandated testing
was unconstitutional); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (declaring that a Peunslyvania
statute which provided equipment and books to parochial schools was unconstitutional); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 601 (1971).
85. See, eg., Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (de-
claring that a statute providing vocational rehabilitation services for visually handicapped per-
sons was constitutional even though the recipient attended a religious institution); Board of
Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. I v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ. of the
Township of Erving, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9
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ernment and the religious organization, 6 and whether the relationship
will require on-going monitoring.' An additional concern considered
by the Court in some decisions is whether the challenged action will
create excessive political divisiveness. 8s In Bowen, the Court stated
that "the question of 'political divisiveness' should be regarded as con-
fined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial
schools or to teachers in parochial schools." 9
B. Alternative "Tests"
The Supreme Court has continued to use the Lemon Test when
faced with an Establishment Clause challenge, sometimes with great
controversy.90 In the wake of this controversy, two competing tests
have been advanced by Supreme Court Justices. Justice O'Connor's
Endorsement Test91 involves questioning "[t]he meaning of a state-
ment to its audience... the intention of the speaker and on the 'ob-
jective' meaning of the statement in the community."' 9 Under this
test, a wider range of activities would be upheld as constitutional than
would be upheld under the Lemon Test.
The second alternative advanced to replace the Lemon Test was the
Coercion-Based Test introduced by Justice Kennedy.93 The Coercion-
Based Test requires a showing of direct coercion or proselytizing
before the challenged action is found unconstitutional.94 This test is
the least restrictive and would provide the greatest range of activities
to be found constitutional. The prevailing test continues to be the
86. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
87. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Adolescent Family Life Act, a program providing for grants to organizations that counsel adoles-
cents about sex and pregnancy).
88. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620. See also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 617.
89. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 617.
90. See County of Alleghany v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-63 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part, and proposing a new test); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,108-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring and proposing a new test); Robert A.
Holland, Comment, A Theory of Establishment Clause Adjudication: Individualism, Social Con-
tract, and the Significance of Coercion in Identifying Threats to Religious Liberty, 80 Cal. L. Rev.
1595 (1992); Patrick F. Brown, Wallace v. Jaffree and The Need To Reform Establishment Clause
Analysis, 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 573 (1986).
91. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding the
constitutionality of a Christmas display that included a Santa Clause house, a Christmas tree,
and a nativity scene). The name "Endorsement Test" came from the text of Justice O'Connor's
opinion which stated "[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders."
Id. at 688.
92. Id. at 690.
93. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 659-60 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id. at 660-63.
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Lemon Test because neither of the alternatives nor any other sug-
gested analyses have been endorsed by a majority.
IV. HISTORY OF PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Supreme Court Case Law
The Lemon Test and its predecessors have often been applied when
the Supreme Court was faced with a challenged action that took place
in a school setting.95 Before a detailed analysis of court decisions on
the question of the validity of a "moment of silence" can occur, it is
important to examine the types of cases the Supreme Court has de-
cided which involved prayers in public school.
1. School Sponsored/Mandatory Prayer
In Engel v. Vitale,96 the Court was asked to decide whether a state
prepared prayer recited aloud in the presence of the teacher was con-
stitutional. The Court seemed to rely strongly on the theory of a
"wall" of separation between church and state, remarking that "[t]he
history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. '97 How-
ever, as one commentator noted, "it is neither sacreligious nor antire-
ligious to say that each separate government in this country should
stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and
leave that purely religious function to the people themselves or to
those whom the people choose to look for religious guidance.19 8
The Court's decision in Engel was followed quickly by the decision
in Schempp.99 In that case, the Supreme Court held that required Bi-
ble reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in a classroom setting
were unconstitutional.1' ° The Court again appeared to rely on a the-
ory of a "wall" of separation. The Court stated that the "neither a
State nor the federal government can set up a church.., or pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another."''1 1 More recently in Stone v. Graham, the Court found that
posting a copy of the Ten Commandments in public schools was un-
constitutional. 0 2 The Court applied the Lemon Test and found there
95. See eg., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking a statute requiring teacher-led prayer in school).
96. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
97. 1d at 434.
98. Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Constitutionality of Regulation or Policy Governing
Prayer, Meditation, or "Moment of Silence" in Public Schools, 110 A.L.R. Fed 211, 297 (1992).
99. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 216.
102. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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was no secular purpose for such action. °3 The Commonwealth of
Kentucky argued that the notation printed on each display was suffi-
cient to avoid conflict with the First Amendment.1°4 However, the
Court adopted the trial court's labeling of this statutory declaration as
self-serving.10 5
2. Prayer During Nonschool Activities
The Supreme Court has also considered whether prayers conducted
before, during, or after a school graduation ceremony are constitu-
tional. In Lee v. Weisman,0 6 the Court held that prayers or invoca-
tions at public school graduation ceremonies were unconstitutional. 107
The Court reached its decision by applying the Lemon Test.
3. Noncompulsory Prayer
As to the constitutionality of noncompulsory prayers in public
schools, the Court stated in Engel that "the Establishment Clause, un-
like the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend on any showing of
governmental compulsion ... ."108 In Engel, even though the students
were not compelled to recite a government prepared prayer, recita-
tion of such prayer in class was considered unconstitutional. 1 9
4. "Moment of Silence"
The Supreme Court has heard only one case involving the constitu-
tionality of a "moment of silence." In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court
applied the Lemon Test to determine whether an Alabama statute au-
thorizing a one-minute "moment of silence" was constitutional." 0 In
considering whether the challenged action had a secular purpose, the
Supreme Court considered the legislative history, express purpose of
the statute, and the legislative intent. As the Court had noted earlier
in Lynch v. Donnelly, these factors can be especially important when
applying the first prong of the Lemon Test."' The Wallace Court
103. Id. at 41.
104. Id. The Legislature required the following notation in small print at the bottom of each
display: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the
fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States." Id.
105. Id.
106. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
107. Id. See also Allan Gordus, Note, The Establishment Clause and Prayers in Public High
School Graduations: Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 47 Arm L. RFv. 653
(1994).
108. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430.
109. Id. at 421.
110. 472 U.S. 38 (1984) and Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1994); See also Patrick F.
Brown, Wallace v. Jaffree and The Need To Reform Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CATH.
U.L. REv. 573 (1986).
111. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
1996]
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noted that a second statute had been subsequently adopted which au-
thorized teachers to lead willing students in a prescribed prayer."2
The Court found that a modification from private reflection to
teacher-led prayer reflected the legislature's true intent, which was to
return voluntary prayer to the public schools.113 As previously dis-
cussed, this concept had been established as unconstitutional.
The Wallace Court also considered the minutes of the legislative
hearings held prior to the statute's adoption, and found they reflected
an attitude of endorsing religion."4 Finally, the Court considered tes-
timony of the bill's sponsor that he believed the statute was a way to
bring religion back into the public schools."' The Court concluded
that the sole purpose of the challenged action was sectarian, and
therefore, it failed the first prong of the Lemon Test.116 Since the Ala-
bama statute failed the first prong of the Lemon Test, there was no
need to consider the second and third prongs."17
B. Federal Courts Case Law
Lower federal courts have dealt with the constitutionality of "mo-
ment of silence" statutes more often than the Supreme Court, and
have upheld a number of challenged statutes." 8 The lower courts also
have applied the Lemon Test, and have found that a "moment of si-
lence" can have a secular purpose. For example, in Gaines v. Ander-
son, a "moment of silence" at the beginning of each school day was
found to be constitutional because one of the stated secular purposes
was to induce respect for the authority of the teacher." 9
112. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40; Alabama Code § 16-1-20.2 provided as follows: "From hence-
forth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institution within the state of Alabama,
recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray,
may lead willing students in prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following prayer to
God .. "
113. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60.
114. Id. at 56-57.
115. Id. at 57. When asked whether he had any purpose other than returning voluntary
prayer to the public schools, Senator Donald Holmes answered, "no, I did not have no [sic] other
purpose in mind."
116. Wallace at 60-61.
117. See eg., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
394; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
118. See, e.g., Allen v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 179 F. Supp. 1532 (M.D. Fl. 1989);
Fink v. Board of Educ., 442 A.2d 837 (Pa. 1982); Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D.C.
Mass. 1976); Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965); See also Andrew W. Hall,
A Moment of Silence: A Permissible Accommodation Protecting the Capacity to Form Relgious
Belief, 61 IND. L.J. 429 (1986); David Z. Seide, Daily Moments of Silence In Public Schools: A
Consitutional Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 364 (1983).
119. 421 F. Supp. 337, 342 (D. Mass. 1976).
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The lower federal courts have also found some "moment of silence"
statutes unconstitutional.120 In May v. Coopennan, the court ex-
amined the legislative history surrounding the statute's adoption, just
as the Supreme Court did in Wallace. 2 ' The court in Walter v. West
Virginia Board of Education also appeared to rely on the legislative
history surrounding the adoption of the West Virginia statute." In
addition, the court in Walter considered the bill's sponsor's statements,
as had the Supreme Court in Wallace.'23 Finally, in Beck v. McElrath,
the court again looked at the legislative history and intent behind the
adoption of the "moment of silence" statute. 24
The significance of the lower court opinions is not whether the chal-
lenged statutes were found constitutional, but the analysis applied in
deciding the question of constitutionality. The majority of cases in
which a "moment of silence" statute was upheld were decided prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Wallace.:2 Subsequent to the Wal-
lace decision, however, similar statues were declared unconstitu-
tional.12 This is significant for two reasons. First, it indicates that
following the lead of the Wallace Court, federal courts will apply in-
creased scrutiny to the first prong of the Lemon Test. Second, it indi-
cates that most lower courts will find that a "moment of silence"
statute lacks a secular legislative purpose and therefore, it fails to sat-
isfy the first prong. The analysis of the "moment of silence" statute
120. See e.g., May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985); Walter v. West Virginia Bd. of
Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. W. Va. 1985); Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schs., 557 F. Supp. 1013
(D.C. N.M. 1983); Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); See also Note, The
Unconstitutionality of State Statutes Authorizing Moments of Silence In The Public Schools, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1874 (1983).
121. 780 F.2d 240,243-46,252 (3d. Cir. 1985) (holding that a New Jersey statute was uncon-
stitutional because the legislative history revealed repeated attempts to mandate school prayer
that were subsequently vetoed by the Governor of New Jersey).
122. Walter, 610 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. W.Va. 1985) (holding that the W. Va. Const. Art. III,
§ 15-a was unconstitional because the court found that children were teased in school for not
participating in the "moment of silence" and the legislative history revealed that a House delgate
quoted a constitutents letter stating "I believe it is time when we should welcome God back into
the classrooms and not by just meditation but by prayer and praise also.") Id. at 1176.
123. Walter, 610 F. Supp. at 1175.
124. 548 F. Supp. 1161 (1984); 1982 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 899, § 1 (declaring that Tenn. Code
Ann § 49-1922 must be amended because the "overwhelming intent among legislators support-
ing the bill, including the sponsors, was to establish prayer, as a daily fixture in the public school-
rooms of Tennessee.") Id. at 1163.
125. See, eg. Fink v. Board of Educ. of the Warren Cty. Sch. Dist., 442 A.2d 837 (Pa. 1982)
(upholding a Pennsylvania statute that allowed a moment of silence but finding a violation of the
statute by a teacher who led prayers and readings from the Bible); Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F.
Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (upholding a "moment of silence" statute that allowed a moment of
reflection before, lunch).
126. See e.g., May v. Cooperman, 780 F2d 240 (3d. Cir. 1985); Walter v. West Virginia Bd. of
Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. W. Va. 1985); Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass.
1976).
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recently enacted in North Carolina hinges upon these two fundamen-
tal assumptions.
V. Tiim NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE
A. History
The North Carolina "moment of silence" bill12 7 was sponsored by
Representative Frances Cummings from Robeson County."z Ms.
Cummings is a professional educator and was elected on a platform of
education reform. Her purpose for proposing the "moment of si-
lence" bill was to get students and teachers to "turn to an all powerful
being" for help with problems and for guidance when necessary.' 29
Her inspiration for the proposed bill was the "Holy Spirit."'130 She
also relied on North Carolina Constitution Article 6, § 8 and Article 9,
§ 1 as the constitutional bases for the proposed bill.131 Ms. Cummings
subsequently abandoned the bill because she objected to the Senate
127. H.R. Res. 202, Sess, 1995.
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-47(29) (Supp. 1995) reads as rewritten:
To Require the Observance of a Moment of Silence in All School Units. -
To afford students and teachers a moment of quiet reflection at the beginning of each day in
the public schools, to create a boundary between school time and nonschool time, and to set
a tone of decorum in the classroom that will be conducive to discipline and learning, every
local board of education shall adopt a policy to require the observance of a moment of
silence at the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in the public schools.
Such a policy may provide that the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held
may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be ob-
served and that during that period silence shall be maintained and no one may engage in
any other activities. Such period of silence shall be totally and completely unstructured and
free of guidance or influence of any kind from any sources.
129. Interview with Rep. Frances Cummings, N.C. General Assembly, in Raleigh, N.C. (July
6, 1995).
130. Id
131. N.C. CONSr. art. 6, § 8 states, in part: "Disqualifications for office. The following per-
sons shall be disqualified for office; First, any person who shall deny the being of almighty God."
N.C. CONST. art. 9, § 1 states: "Education encouraged. Religion, morality, and knowledge be-
ing necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged."
15
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version.132 She has since endorsed an amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution which would allow prayer in schools. 133
B. Major Types of "Moment of Silence" Statutes
There are three major types of "moment of silence" statutes. One
type attempts to avoid any mention of religion or religious content of
the "moment of silence."'1 34 Rather, these statutes refer to the "mo-
ment of silence" as meditation,' 35 quiet reflection, 36 or quiet and pri-
vate contemplation or introspection. 37 Although a Massachusetts
statute originally contained the words "or prayer," in a suit challeng-
ing its constitutionality, the words were struck and the statute was up-
held.' 38 The North Carolina statute contains no mention of religion or
religious content in defining the "moment of silence.' 3 9 However,
132. Ms. Cummings withdrew her support for the proposed bill after the Senate changed the
wording from "such a policy shall provide" to "such a policy may provide" (emphasis added).
She explained that this revision eviscerated the proposed bill and essentially left the law as it
currently existed.
Ms. Cummings voted against the Senate version, S.B. 140, Reg. Sess., 1995, N.C. Laws Ch. 497,
which was adopted by the House. The Senate version became effective in August, 1995.
For local news coverage of the proposed bill, See Kari C. Barlow, McKoy, Carrington to Sup-
port Schools' Moment of Silence Bill, TBE RALE GH EXTRA, Mar. 26,1995, at 18; Kari Barlow &
Susan Margolis, Prayer, The Pledge and The Law, Tim RALEIGH EXTRA, June 18, 1995, at 10;
Danny Lineberry, Republicans Write A Paradox with School Bills, THm HERALD-SuN, Apr. 9,
1995, at A14; Odds & Ends, Naws & REcoRD, Mar. 18,1995, at A6; Religion And Schools, THm
HERALD-SuN, Mar. 30, 1995, at A14; What's Behind 'Moment of Silence' Legislation?, NEws &
REcoRD, Apr. 18,1995, at A6; Barry Yeoman, House of Horrors; Scary Monsters Haunt the New
Legislature, Tm INDEPENDENT WYLY., July 19, 1995, at D9.
133. H.RJ. Res. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.RJ. Res. 16, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R.J. Res. 19, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 67, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); SJ. Res. 6, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S3. Res. 7, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); See
also Howard Fineman, Clinton's Values Blowout, NEwswEEK, Dec. 19, 1994, at 24; William
Safire, Better Go To 1; Mr. President; Clinton Should Get Off the Floor, Act Like A President,
THE DAYTON DAILY NEws, Nov. 21, 1994, at All.
134. See A.. CODE § 16-1-20 (1994); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-522 (1994); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 10-16A (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4101 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-
2-1050 (1994); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 1A (Law. Co-op. 1994); Mxcn. Coae. LAWS ANN.
§ 380.1565 (Law. Co-op. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-4 (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-
12-3.1 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1004 (1994).
135. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (1994); Aiuz REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-522 (1994); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 16-12-3.1 (1994).
136. See GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1994); For local news coverage of Georgia's statute,
see Mark Curriden, Perspective, Tim ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 20, 1994, at 1; Metro and
Georgia In Brieft Governor Signs Classroom Silence Bill, Tim ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 26,
1994, at 2; Ben Smith III, '94 Georgia Legislature 'Reflection' Bill Gets Through On Final Day
Session With Conservative Tone Rejects Efforts For Gun Control, Tim ATA NA J. & CONST.,
Mar. 17,1994, at 1; Ruling On School Silence Is Sound, Tim ATLANTA J. & CONsr., Aug. 3,1995,
at A16; Nichell J. Taylor and Diane Loupe, Teacher's Stance The Buzz at South Students' Vwews
on Issue Divided, Tim ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 24, 1994, at 1.
137. NJ. REv. STAT. § 18A:36-4 (1995).
138. Gaines v. Anderson 421 F. Supp. 337, 339 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1976) (citing Mass. Gen. L.
ch. 130 (1966).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-47(29) (1995) See supra note 128.
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the lack of the mention of religion or prayer has not saved all "mo-
ment of silence" statutes. 140 This outcome seems even more certain
given the Supreme Court's emphasis in Wallace that such a statute
must have a secular purpose.
Unlike the statutes that omit any reference to religion, the second
type contains words conveying a religious purpose or allowing volun-
tary prayer during the "moment of silence.' 14 1 These statutes allow
for a "moment of silence" for the purpose of silent prayer,142 volun-
tary religious observance 143 and silent prayer.'" The North Dakota
and Maryland statutes are probably most unusual because both allow
for daily Bible reading led by the teacher. 45
Also unusual is a Texas statute which states that every student has
"an absolute right to... pray...."1" This unique wording is proba-
bly a result of Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent
School District.47 In Lubbock, a school district had been holding or-
ganized prayer but made an effort to hide it through various superfi-
cial changes to the school's policy. The court stated that the
modifications did not change the overall purpose from sectarian to
secular and therefore struck the school district's policy. In addition,
the court noted that the First Amendment does ensure that every stu-
dent has a right to pray without a specific time set aside. It appears
that this case was a stepping stone, similar to Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub-
lic Schools'4 striking a local school board ordinance that allowed one
minute of silence at the beginning of each school day, to the Supreme
Court's decision in Wallace.14 9
The North Carolina statute clearly omits any reference to religion,
perhaps in an effort to avoid detailed scrutiny of the events surround-
ing its adoption.
140. Duffy, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D. N.M. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.1 (1978) (repealed
1995).
141. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 233.062 (West 1994); ILT. COMPILED STAT. ANN. ch. 105, para.
20/1 (1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-10.1-7.8 to -7-11 (Bums 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5308a
(1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:2115 (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., EDUa § 7-104 (1994);
MIsS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-4 (1993); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3029-a (Consol. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 15-38-12 (1993); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.601 (Anderson 1994); TFx. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 25.901 (West 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203 (Michie 1994).
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 233.062 (West 1994); See generally Michael Griffin, Senators Work to
Put Prayer Back in Schools, SuN-SEN rmm., Apr. 19, 1995, at A14.
143. n D. CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-7-8 (Bums 1994).
144. See, eg., IND. CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-7-11 (1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:2115 (West
1995).
145. MD. CoDE ANN., EDUC. § 7-104(b) (1994) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38-12 (1993).
146. Thx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.901 (West 1995).
147. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 495 U.S. 1155 (1983).
148. 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D. N.M. 1983).
149. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Finally, the third type of "moment of silence" statutes have been
contested and found unconstitutional and either abandoned entirely
or rewritten.' 50 This group includes the Alabama statute that was the
basis for the Wallace v. Jaffree decision.151 In addition, a New Mexico
statute was found unconstitutional in Duffy.'5 In considering
whether there was a secular purpose for adoption of the statute, the
Duffy court examined committee notes and the testimony of board
members and the bill's sponsor. The court decided that the purpose
of the statute was merely to find a way "which would authorize some
form of prayer in... public schools."' 53
C. Statutes Currently Being Considered in Other States
Some states are currently considering "moment of silence" stat-
utes. 54 For instance, Utah rejected a "moment of silence" statute and
instead adopted a resolution to encourage an amendment to the
United States Constitution which would allow a "moment of si-
lence."' -5 5 Also, a Texas House Committee is considering a bill that
would require the state to indemnify and assist any school district or
school employee sued for following its "moment of silence" statute. 56
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE
In analyzing the constitutionality of North Carolina's statute, a
court would likely apply the Lemon Test as used in Wallace v. Jaffree.
Under the first prong, the Court would address whether the statute
has a secular purpose.157 As the Court stated in Wallace, it is neces-
sary to look past the stated purpose in the statute itself and examine
committee notes and the sponsor's stated purpose for the statute. 58
Ms. Cummings stated that the purpose of her bill was to "encourage
150. ALA. CODE §§ 16-1-20.1 & 16-1-20.2 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-16-119 (Michie 1994)
(repealed 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.1 (1978).
151. 472 U.S. 38 (1984).
152. 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D. N.M. 1983) (The statute provided, in part, as follows: "Each local
school board may authorize a period of silence not to exceed one minute at the beginning of the
school day. This period may be used for contemplation, meditation, or prayer, provided that
silence is maintained and no activities are undertaken.").
153. Id. at 1015.
154. See H.R. Res. 78, Sess., 1995 Ky. (introduced on June 26, 1995); H.B.Res. 294, Sess.,
1995 Ky. (introduced on May 31, 1995); H.R. Res. 656, Sess., 1995 ME. (suggesting a change
from the current law that would require observance of a "moment of silence," the bill was sent
to a joint committee which vetoed the bill).
155. H. Res. 6, Sess., 1995 UTAH (passed both the House and Senate on Feb. 20, 1995).
156. H.B. Res. 784, Sess., 1995 TFx. (sent to Civil Procedures Committee on Feb. 2, 1995).
157. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
158. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60.
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people to turn to prayer."' 59 Acording to Ms. Cummings, a large por-
tion of society's current problems, including drugs, dysfunctional fami-
lies, and lower student competency, are a result of the lack of prayer
in schools.' 60 Based on her comments, it appears the purpose of the
statute was to return prayer to school - the same reason the statute
in Wallace-was found unconstitutional. 161 Therefore, it seems likely
that a court would find the statute unconstitutional based on its inabil-
ity to satisify the first prong of the Lemon Test.
The second prong requires that the principal or primary effect of
the action neither advance nor inhibit religion.162 As the Court stated
in Aguilar v. Felton, there are three possible analyses under this
prong. 63 The Aguilar Court began its analysis by looking at the type
of institution that would carry out the challenged action to determine
whether it was pervasively sectarian. 64 The North Carolina statute
provides for a "moment of silence" in a public school setting. Since a
public school is a secular location, there should be no concern that the
challenged action takes place in a pervasively sectarian institution.
The second analysis advanced by the Aguilar Court was to consider
the audience of the challenged action.' 65 The audience of North Car-
olina's statute would be school-age children. The Grand Rapids Court
expressed concern about the unique susceptibility to indoctrination of
school-age children because of their age and inexperience. 66 One
might argue that no indoctrination would be taking place in North
Carolina schools because no one particular prayer is being used.
However, this argument would not satisfy atheist or agnostic parents
who do not formally pray. Their children are likely to feel a certain
amount of pressure to participate, regardless of their beliefs.
Under the third analysis, a court may analyze whether the "moment
of silence" creates the appearance of a "crucial symbolic link."'167 A
teacher directing public school children to take time out for a "mo-
ment of silence" seems likely to create some type of link between
prayer and the teacher, even though the children are not instructed to
actually pray. This link may seem relatively inconsequential, but
159. Interview with Rep. Francis Cummings, N.C. Gen. Assembly, in Raleigh, N.C. (July 6,
1995).
160. Id. During the interview, Ms. Cummings stated that the Court's decision in Engle v.
Vitale declaring prayer in schools unconstitutional represented the beginning of our current soci-
etal problems.
161. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60-61.
162. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
163. 473 U.S. 402, 411 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 61-75.
164. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 411.
165. Id. See also Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 391 (1985).
166. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 391.
167. Id. at 390.
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based on the Court's previous rulings, it appears sufficient for a find-
ing that the primary effect of the statute is to advance religion. Conse-
quently, the statute would fail the second prong of the Lemon Test. 68
The third prong of the Lemon Test prohibits excessive entangle-
ment between the government and religion.169 The first factor to con-
sider is the character and purpose of the institution.170 The North
Carolina public school system would be the institution in question.
There is little argument that it is secular in purpose and character.
The second factor is the type of aid the State would provide.' 7'
Under its statute, North Carolina would provide little, if any, direct
aid. Rather, the aid would be indirect - setting aside time for prayer.
The third factor a court may consider is the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious institution. 72 The "mo-
ment of silence" would take place in a secular institution and there
would be no on-going monitoring by the State. The issue of the stat-
ute's potential for political divisiveness would not be raised since
there would be no direct financial subsidy to a sectarian institution. 73
Because North Carolina's "moment of silence" statute does not foster
an excessive entanglement with religion, it would satisfy the third
prong of the Lemon Test.
In summary, the "moment of silence" statute would likely be de-
clared unconstitutional because it fails two of the three prongs of the
Lemon Test established by the Supreme Court.
MARGARFT RICHARDSON
168. See Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434
U.S. 125 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
169. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
170. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762 (1976).
171. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 763.
172. Id.
173. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n. 14 (suggesting that political divisiveness be
considered only in cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools); Roemer,
426 U.S. at 765.
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